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OPT-OUT VOTING 
Michael J. Pitts* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine for a moment that you are a registered voter casting a 
ballot in the U.S. presidential election. What generally happens in such 
an election today is that you acquire a ballot—either by making the 
journey to a polling place on election day (or in the days leading up to 
election day) or receiving a ballot, such as an absentee ballot, by mail 
just prior to the election.
1 That ballot has the eligible candidates listed on 
it. You select the candidate you prefer—by filling in an oval, pressing a 
button on the machine, or some other method of marking the ballot—
then cast your vote and proceed with your usual daily routine.
2
 
Now imagine a different type of system. In this system, your local 
election administrator mails you a ballot. And instead of having to check 
off a box for a candidate, you already have a candidate randomly pre-
selected for you. At this point, you have several options: (1) do nothing 
and your vote will be cast for your pre-selected candidate; (2) change 
your vote from the pre-selected candidate to another candidate and mail 
notice of that change to the local election administrator; or (3) mail to 
the local election administrator notice of a change in your vote from the 
pre-selected candidate to the category of ―None of the Above.‖ 
This latter system is what I will refer to in this paper as ―opt-out 
voting,‖ and what opt-out voting accomplishes is to change the default 
rule for electoral participation. The system currently used in the United 
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States operates from a baseline of non-participation by a registered 
voter. To make known a preference at an election, a registered voter 
must always take some affirmative step—travel to a polling place, 
request an absentee ballot, etc.
3 In stark contrast, opt-out voting operates 
from a baseline of participation by a registered voter. Once registered, 
the registered voter knows that she will definitely be casting a ballot in 
the election in some way, shape, or form. 
This Article contends that opt-out voting might present a superior 
system of casting ballots to the United States‘s current system of 
balloting. Opt-out voting holds the promise of being a better system 
because it might put a significant dent in what represents one of the most 
pressing problems of democracy in the United States—the low 
participation
4
 rate of the citizenry in elections. Opt-out voting should 
increase participation, especially in less high-profile elections (i.e., state 
and local elections), because it changes the default rule for registered 
voters from non-participation to participation. 
Theoretically, opt-out voting represents a proposal that stems from 
the literature related to creating default options that will spur positive 
action on the part of individuals—something commonly known as 
―libertarian paternalism.‖5 By changing the baseline from non-
participation to participation, opt-out voting is paternalistic in that it 
nudges registered voters in the direction of casting a ballot. Importantly, 
though, opt-out voting is libertarian in that it preserves the ability of any 
citizen to not select a candidate in an election—either by not registering 
to vote or by casting a ballot for ―None of the Above.‖ For this latter 
reason, opt-out voting represents something of a compromise between 
our current system and more draconian proposals of compulsory voting 
with fines for noncompliance that have been championed by some 
commentators in recent years as the optimal solution to the United 
States‘s turnout problem.6 
                                                          
 3. A Voter‘s Guide to Federal Elections, supra note 1.  
 4. The term ―participation‖ is used in this Article in the narrow sense as only relating to the 
act of casting a ballot in an election, as opposed to a broader definition that might include such 
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 5. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 
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 6. See Christopher W. Carmichael, Proposals for Reforming the American Electoral System 
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91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 11 (1997) (―Compulsory voting cannot solve the entire conflict between 
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While opt-out voting might be a superior system on a theoretical 
level, several caveats must be made plain at the outset. For starters, 
because opt-out voting is not to my knowledge used anywhere, no 
definitive empirical evidence exists to support the theory behind opt-out 
voting. In other words, while theoretically opt-out voting may be a 
superior system, absent actual experimentation, it is impossible to prove 
that opt-out voting would actually be superior in practice. In addition, 
the likelihood of adopting opt-out voting seems slim. At the moment, 
opt-out voting just does not comport with traditional notions about 
elections that I suspect most persons hold near and dear, and there are 
nuts-and-bolts election administration problems that must be sorted out. 
Put simply, opt-out voting is more haute couture than ready-to-wear. 
Yet exploring opt-out voting serves several useful purposes. First, 
as previously mentioned, opt-out voting amounts to a novel idea that 
forges something of a compromise between our current system and 
stronger proposals for compulsory voting that have been advocated 
elsewhere. Second, explication of a theory of opt-out voting might lead 
to the experimentation needed to determine whether the theory holds up. 
Put differently, any new idea will meet with firm resistance, but the first, 
seemingly impossible proposal may spark a shift in the conversation that 
will lead to the eventual adoption of the proposal or a related idea. 
Finally, on a more macro level, opt-out voting represents a type of 
proposal that shifts the default electoral rules from non-participation to 
participation. And, to the extent fairly widespread agreement exists 
regarding the importance of encouraging democratic participation by 
citizens, describing opt-out voting and the theory behind it might lead 
commentators to think more about ways that we can create default rules 
of election administration designed to foster participation. 
This Article will describe the basic mechanics of opt-out voting, 
including an explanation of how opt-out voting comports on some level 
with the literature on default options in Part II. In Part III, the theoretical 
benefits of opt-out voting will then be presented with a focus on the 
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potential for opt-out voting to increase participation by the citizenry in 
elections and why an increase in participation would be positive. Finally, 
in Part IV, the Article will explore potential objections to opt-out voting. 
II. THEORETICAL ROOTS AND THE BASIC PROPOSAL 
The proposal to have registered voters opt out of casting ballots for 
candidates in elections rather than having them ―opt in‖ extends a 
burgeoning literature that aims to create default rules that encourage 
individuals to, essentially, ―do the right thing.‖ This Part briefly sketches 
that literature and explains how this literature already seems to be 
influencing at least one electoral context—voter registration. After this 
brief background, a description of the basic nature of the proposal for 
opt-out voting follows. 
A. “Libertarian Paternalism‖ and its Potential Insights for Voter 
Registration 
The general theory behind opt-out voting starts from the notion that 
the choices individuals make can be greatly influenced by the context in 
which they make those choices.
7
 Professors Cass Sunstein and Richard 
Thaler refer to this as ―choice architecture‖ and provide a simple 
example of how this works in Nudge.
8
 In that book, Professors Sunstein 
and Thaler describe how the placement of the food in a school cafeteria 
can influence the choices children will make as to food consumption.
9
 
Depending on how the food choices are placed in the buffet line, 
children can be subtly influenced into choosing healthy foods.
10
 Put 
simply, individuals can be influenced to make certain choices depending 
on how the choices are framed.
11
 
                                                          
 7. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 5, at 1161 (―[I]n many domains, people lack clear, stable, 
or well-ordered preferences. What they choose is strongly influenced by details of the context in 
which they make their choice, for example default rules, framing effects (that is, the wording of 
possible options), and starting points.‖). 
 8. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 81-100 (2008). 
 9. Id. at 1-3. 
 10. Id. at 1-2 (―[S]chool children, like adults, can be greatly influenced by small changes in 
the context. The influence can be exercised for better or for worse. For example, [a person] knows 
that she can increase consumption of healthy foods and decrease consumption of unhealthy ones.‖). 
Yet another example of context influencing decisions can be found in the ―ballot-order‖ effect 
where the candidate listed at the top of the ballot gets more votes than she would otherwise have 
received simply by being listed at the top. See generally R. Michael Alvarez et al., How Much Is 
Enough? The ―Ballot Order Effect‖ and the Use of Social Science Research in Election Law 
Disputes, 5 ELECTION L.J. 40, 41-42 (2006) (discussing the ballot order-effect). 
 11. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 81-100. 
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Once it is recognized that context matters to the choices individuals 
will make then the second aspect of the theory behind opt-out voting 
kicks in: the context presented should push (but not compel!) individuals 
toward choices optimal for them and for society.
12
 This is what 
Professors Sunstein and Thaler term ―libertarian paternalism.‖13 The idea 
is that ―in general, people should be free to do what they like—and to 
opt out of undesirable arrangements if they want to do so.‖14 However, 
while freedom to choose should be preserved, the context provided by 
government and private industry for choices should ―try to influence 
people‘s behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and 
better.‖15 
Importantly, libertarian paternalism does not absolutely mandate 
that individuals make the ―right‖ choice because it only tries to subtly 
move them—―nudge‖ them—in the direction of the best choice.16 As 
Professors Sunstein and Thaler explain: 
A nudge . . . is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters 
people‘s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any 
options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To 
count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to 
avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting the fruit at eye level 
counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not.
17
 
                                                          
 12. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 5, at 1161 (―We urge that such [legal and organizational] 
rules should be chosen with the explicit goal of improving the welfare of the people affected by 
them.‖). Admittedly, Sunstein & Thaler seem to focus on how government can nudge an individual 
to make the best decision for herself. The act of voting, though, may not be the rationally best 
choice for an individual. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 274 (1957); 
see William H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 25, 34 (1968). Thus, it might be a bit controversial to extend libertarian paternalism to nudge 
an individual to make a choice that may be beneficial to society as a whole, but not to the individual 
herself. But see Pierre Schlag, Nudge, Choice Architecture, and Libertarian Paternalism, 108 MICH. 
L. REV. 913, 916 (2010) (reviewing RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2008)) (describing how a 
potential nudge to make people vote would be to ―prime them‖ to cast ballots by ―call[ing] them up 
the day before and ask[ing] them whether they intend to vote‖). However, nudging individuals to 
vote for the betterment of society might fall into what Sunstein & Thaler call ―libertarian 
benevolence.‖ Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 5, at 1193 (describing libertarian benevolence as ―an 
approach that attempts to promote benevolence . . . without mandating behavior in any way‖). 
 13. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 5, at 1160-61. Closely related to the concept of 
libertarian paternalism is what another group of authors refers to as ―asymmetric paternalism.‖ See 
Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 
―Asymmetric Paternalism,‖ 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1221-22 (2003). 
 14. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 5. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 5-6. 
 17. Id. at 6; see also Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 5, at 1161 (―[W]e do not aim to defend 
any approach that blocks individual choices.‖). 
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With the theory of libertarian paternalism explicated, one then turns 
to applications of the theory in various contexts. Professors Sunstein and 
Thaler have spent much of their energy applying their theory to financial 
matters (i.e., how to encourage retirement savings) and environmental 
regulation.
18
 What may be just as interesting, though, is to think about 
how default rules might be created to improve democracy in the United 
States. More specifically, how can default rules be created that will lead 
to greater electoral participation in the United States without being too 
heavy-handed? 
Voter registration is one area of election administration where 
libertarian paternalism might apply, and here it is necessary to provide 
some background on the National Voter Registration Act (―NVRA‖).19 
The NVRA represented an effort to expand voter registration 
opportunities.
20
 While the NVRA did many things to improve voter 
registration in the United States, for present purposes the most important 
aspect of the NVRA involves the requirement that states provide voter 
registration opportunities at certain government offices.
21
 Most notably, 
states must provide voter registration at agencies where public assistance 
is available and at places where driver‘s licenses are issued (i.e., offices 
that are part of a state bureau of motor vehicles).
22
 
When it comes to the possibility of applying libertarian paternalism 
to the NVRA‘s requirement of voter registration at certain government 
agencies, it is important to understand what a citizen currently must do 
to register when she is, say, applying for a driver‘s license at the local 
bureau of motor vehicles: the citizen must opt in.
23
 In all states, the 
applicant for the license must affirmatively check a box in order to 
register.
24
 The Commonwealth of Virginia, for example, asks at the top 
of its driver‘s license application form: ―Do you want to apply to register 
 
 
                                                          
 18. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 107-09, 183-85.  
 19. See National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to -10 (2006). 
 20. Id. § 1973gg(b)(1)–(2). 
 21. See id. § 1973gg-5. 
 22. Id. § 1973gg-3(c)(1), gg-5(a)(2). 
 23. See id. § 1973gg-3(a), (c). 
 24. See Robert Richie, Leave No Voter Behind: Seeking 100 Percent Voter Registration and 
Effective Civic Education, NAT‘L CIVIC REV., Fall 2007, at 39, 43 (describing how no state uses opt-
out registration procedures at driver‘s licensing agencies). In 2009, Minnesota‘s legislature passed a 
bill adopting opt-out voter registration procedures; however, that legislation was vetoed by the 
governor. Nick Busse, No Automatic Voter Registration (Vetoed Bill), MINN. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES (May 29, 2009), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/sessionweekly/art.asp?ls_ 
year=86&issueid_=45&storyid=1355&year_=2009. 
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to vote or change your voter registration address?‖25 Applicants are then 
provided with a box to answer ―YES‖ and a box to answer ―NO‖ by 
writing their initials inside the box.
26
 Put simply, when a person applies 
for a driver‘s license she must take an affirmative step (must opt in) to 
have that driver‘s license application also serve as an application for 
voter registration.
27
 
Yet some argue that the procedure used at NVRA registration 
locations should be shifted to an opt-out system as a means of increasing 
participation in elections.
28
 For instance, instead of an applicant for a 
driver‘s license having to take an affirmative step to register to vote, the 
applicant would be automatically registered at the current address unless 
the applicant took an affirmative step (i.e., checked a box) to indicate an 
unwillingness to register.
29
 In theory, this should increase the number of 
persons who appear on the registration list and, therefore, increase the 
proportion of ballots cast at elections.
30
 
So it may be possible to increase electoral participation by changing 
the default option for voter registration at certain government agencies 
from non-registration to registration. Voter registration, however, does 
not ensure a citizen will actually cast a ballot.
31
 While the vast majority 
of registered voters participate in the general presidential election every 
four years, far fewer registered voters participate in other elections.
32
 
The next step, then, would be to consider whether a default structure 
could be designed not just for voter registration, but for the actual 
casting of ballots. Here, opt-out voting might fit the bill. 
                                                          
 25. Driver‘s License and Identification Card Application, VA. DEP‘T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 
http://www.dmv.state.va.us/webdoc/pdf/dl1p.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2011). 
 26. The form states that answering this question is ―requested but not required to apply for a 
driver‘s license . . . .‖ Id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. Richie, supra note 24, at 43; Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and Election Reform, 17 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 453, 499 (2008) (noting that one possible voter registration reform is 
that ―citizens [be] automatically registered when they interface with certain governmental entities‖); 
Laura Seago, Automatic Registration in the United States: The Selective Service Example, 
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST., 14-15 (2009), http://brennan.3cdn.net/b00a78fefae1c6695e_ 
exm6i2a7f.pdf (advocating an opt-out system of voter registration). 
 29. See Busse, supra note 24; Driver‘s License and Identification Card Application, supra 
note 25. 
 30. To the best of my knowledge, no research exists that estimates how many more persons 
would register and participate with the adoption of opt-out voter registration. 
 31. Table 1. Reported Voting and Registration, by Sex and Single Years of Age: November 
2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 2009), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/ 
publications/p20/2008/Table%2001.xls. 
 32. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
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B. Opt-Out Voting 
Opt-out voting‘s basic design is relatively simple. (We will deal 
with major election administration-related complications later.)
33
 Opt-
out voting would randomly assign a pre-selected candidate to every 
registered voter and would then allow each voter to opt out of the 
predetermined selection. In other words, the baseline for a registered 
voter‘s participation in an election would be as a participant in the 
election, and a registered voter would have to choose not to select any 
candidate in an election.
34
 A simple, concrete hypothetical provides the 
best tool to demonstrate the system‘s essentials. 
The first step will be to identify the number of registered voters and 
the number of candidates, and then to randomly assign a candidate to 
each registered voter so that an even division of votes results between 
the candidates. For instance, let‘s say Marge is a registered voter who 
lives in Springfield, a town with 100 total registered voters. In the 
upcoming town mayoral election, there are two candidates: Quimby and 
Winston. Prior to the election, Marge (along with every other registered 
voter in the town) would have her vote randomly assigned by the local 
election administrator to either Quimby or Winston—with each of the 
two candidates receiving exactly half of the registered voters. Thus, at 
the ―start‖ of the election, Quimby and Winston each have fifty votes. 
The next step involves notifying each voter of the pre-selected 
choice and giving the voter the opportunity to opt out of the pre-selected 
choice. For example, Marge would receive some sort of notice in the 
mail that her ballot was currently ―cast‖ for, say, Quimby. Marge would 
then have a set period of time (perhaps thirty days) to ―finalize‖ her 
ballot and this ballot finalization could be accomplished in several ways: 
(1) If Marge wanted to vote for her pre-selected choice, Quimby, then 
Marge would have to do nothing. Put differently, to vote for Quimby, 
Marge must merely look at the notice and see that it reflects her 
preference for the mayoral election. 
(2) If Marge wanted to vote differently from her pre-selected choice 
and cast a ballot for Winston, then Marge would fill out a ballot to 
switch her preference and mail that ballot back to the local election 
administrator.
35
 The local election administrator would then switch 
Marge‘s vote from Quimby to Winston. 
(3) If Marge disapproved of both options with which she was 
                                                          
 33. See infra Part IV.B. 
 34. While this Article discusses opt-out voting in relation to elections for candidates to office, 
presumably opt-out voting could also be used for referenda and the like. 
 35. Presumably, this system could one day be done over the Internet, rather than by paper. 
2011] OPT-OUT VOTING 905 
presented, then she would fill out a ballot to indicate ―None of the 
Above.‖ The local election administrator would then switch Marge‘s 
vote from Quimby to ―None of the Above.‖
36
 
At this point, let‘s leave to the side any benefits, costs, and other 
objections one might have to the basic concept and focus on why this 
system meshes to some extent with the libertarian paternalism approach. 
Libertarian paternalism tries to change the context in which persons 
make decisions so that they will make the ―right‖ choices,37 and opt-out 
voting might accomplish this. The context of democracy in the United 
States as currently framed requires registered voters to opt into electoral 
participation. Opt-out voting changes the default option from one in 
which registered voters do not participate to one in which they do 
participate. Opt-out voting shifts the context and, importantly, shifts the 
context for the better: it is better for registered voters to cast ballots in 
elections than to not cast ballots in elections (more on this later). 
Importantly, though, libertarian paternalism aims to maintain 
freedom of choice by making it relatively easy for an individual to make 
what would appear to be the ―wrong‖ choice and, again, on this score 
opt-out voting complies with libertarian paternalism.
38
 A registered voter 
who desires not to cast a ballot in the election can simply fill out a form 
and mail it back saying that she desires not to cast a ballot for anyone 
(i.e., choose the ―None of the Above‖ option). Granted, it is not totally 
costless—nothing is!—but filling out a form and dropping a postage-
paid envelope in the mail amounts to a relatively picayune cost. In short, 
opt-out voting preserves the freedom to choose not to participate in an 
election. 
Opt-out voting does, however, differ a bit from what might be 
described as the paradigmatic application of libertarian paternalism. 
Libertarian paternalism often relies on giving individuals default options 
that they stick with.
39
 For example, libertarian paternalism desires 
individuals to participate in retirement programs such as 401(k)‘s and, 
therefore, defaults individuals into participation in such retirement funds 
                                                          
 36. In the somewhat unlikely event that ―None of the Above‖ wins the election, then a 
decision rule will need to be created to deal with that contingency. One option would be to hold a 
new election. Another option would be to declare the second-place candidate the victor. This latter 
approach is the one taken by Nevada, which is the only state that has adopted a ―None of the 
Above‖ option for federal and statewide contests. See Ashley Powers, ‗None‘ Could Be the 
Kingmaker in Nevada Senate Race, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2010, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/22/nation/la-na-nevada-none-20100922. 
 37. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 5, at 1185-86. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 108-09; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 5, at 
1172-73. 
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with the goal of having the individual adhere to that choice.
40
 In a bit of 
contrast, opt-out voting wants individuals to adhere to the choice of 
participation but does not necessarily desire the voter to stick with the 
particular candidate selected. The hope is that by creating a default of 
participation, registered voters will be spurred into thinking about the 
candidates and into actively (rather than mindlessly) making a choice. 
In some ways, then, opt-out voting might amount to a combination 
of libertarian paternalism with the concept of ―penalty defaults.‖41 As 
Yale‘s Ian Ayres has noted, certain default rules in contract law known 
as ―penalty defaults‖ cause contractors to change their contractual offers 
so as to avoid the default contractual provision.
42
 The rationale for these 
penalty defaults is to set the default rule to what a contracting party 
would not desire as a means to encourage the contracting party to reveal 
information.
43
 In the same way, opt-out voting (as will be discussed in 
more detail in the next Part) hopes to spur voters to act so that they avoid 
the ―penalty‖ of having a ballot cast for a candidate they do not support. 
Put differently, opt-out voting defaults registered voters into casting a 
ballot for some candidate with the hope that this default mechanism 
causes registered voters to pay attention to their ballot in order to head 
off the negative outcome of voting for the ―wrong‖ candidate. In 
essence, this default is intended to force the registered voter to provide 
information (i.e., the registered voter‘s preferred candidate) in the same 
way a penalty default forces a contracting party to provide information.
44
 
Opt-out voting finds theoretical foundation in the literature 
involving default options. But a theoretical basis in the literature does 
not mean opt-out voting should be adopted. There must be some benefit 
to opt-out voting, and it is to the possible benefit to which we now turn. 
III. THE BENEFIT OF OPT-OUT VOTING 
Opt-out voting could be beneficial for democracy in the United 
States. The benefit of opt-out voting would come from the increase in 
                                                          
 40. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 108-11. 
 41. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (discussing the concept of penalty 
defaults). 
 42. Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
589, 595 (2006); see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 41, at 91 (―Penalty defaults are designed to 
give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore 
to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.‖). 
 43. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 41, at 91 (―[P]enalty defaults are purposefully set at what the 
parties would not want—in order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to 
third parties (especially the courts).‖). 
 44. See Ayres, supra note 42, at 595. 
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participation by registered voters. Importantly, increasing participation 
represents an important goal because an increase in participation should 
lead to a more representative electorate. 
A. Increasing Participation 
One of the main problems of democracy in the United States is the 
lack of participation by citizens in elections.
45
 While some elections in 
the United States have a higher turnout than others, for the most part the 
citizenry does not participate in elections to the extent many 
commentators think it should.
46
 As a number of commentators have 
noted throughout the years, only a little more than half of the eligible 
population votes in presidential elections, and even fewer eligible voters 
typically participate in less high-profile contests, such as state and local 
elections.
47
 These statistics leave the United States toward the bottom of 
major democracies when it comes to voter turnout.
48
 
At first blush, one way opt-out voting theoretically may increase 
participation is by slightly increasing the value of a registered voter 
expressing her preference in a typical election. In the current election 
structure, a registered voter has one vote to give to a candidate. But with 
                                                          
 45. Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State Constitutions: 
Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1503 
(1987) (―[T]he great wealth of evidence that electoral participation in America is much lower than 
in other democracies suggests that low voter participation is a significant problem.‖). 
 46. See Ornstein, supra note 6, at A23; Jason P.W. Halperin, Note, A Winner at the Polls: A 
Proposal for Mandatory Voter Registration, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL‘Y 69, 88 (1999). 
 47. Ornstein, supra note 6, at A23. 
 48. FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS STILL DON‘T VOTE 
AND WHY POLITICIANS WANT IT THAT WAY 3 (2000) (―Only about half of the eligible population 
votes in presidential elections, and far fewer vote in off-year elections. As a result, the United States 
ranks at the bottom in turnout compared with other major democracies.‖). Alexander Keyssar 
suggests that: 
The most telling symptom of the malady [of American democracy] is the low level of 
popular participation in American elections: in recent years, only half of all eligible 
adults have voted in presidential elections, and fewer than 40 percent generally cast their 
ballots in other contests. Electoral turnout has declined significantly over the last 
century, and it is markedly lower in the United States than in most other nations. 
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 320 (2000). See also Lijphart, supra note 6, at 5 (―That the United States ranks near 
the bottom of voting participation in comparative perspective is well-known . . . .‖); Jason Marisam, 
Voter Turnout: From Cost to Cooperation, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 190, 191 (2009) (―In the U.S., 
turnout remains low—by historical standards and in comparison to other countries . . . .‖); Halperin, 
supra note 46, at 70-71 (providing statistics on low voter turnout). To be fair, voter participation in 
the two most recent presidential elections (2004 and 2008) may have approached sixty percent of 
the eligible voting population. See Voter Turnout, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, 
http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2011). Nevertheless, that still 
means that forty percent of the eligible population is not voting in the election that typically has the 
highest rate of participation. 
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opt-out voting, at least some registered voters have the potential to not 
only give a candidate a vote but also to take a vote away from another 
candidate. For example, assume as follows: Marge is voting in the 
mayoral contest between Quimby and Winston; Marge prefers Quimby; 
Marge‘s pre-selected ballot is for Winston; and Marge switches her 
ballot from Winston to Quimby. By switching her ballot, Marge has not 
only given one vote to Quimby but also removed one vote from 
Winston. In theory, then, Marge‘s electoral power has increased. 
That said, it seems unlikely that the power of some registered voters 
to have a dual ability to impact an election will make much of a 
difference in voting behavior. Commentators have long recognized the 
irrationality of voting due to the fact that the costs of voting are fairly 
high, while the likelihood of a single vote making a difference in the 
outcome of an election is minimal.
49
 And while opt-out voting now 
creates the potential for some individuals to essentially have the power 
of a two-vote swing, two votes are also unlikely to make much of a 
difference in the outcome of most elections.
50
 Thus, the increased 
likelihood of voting will have to emanate from something other than the 
slightly increased ability of some individual voters to dictate the 
outcome of an election. 
So if the increased electoral power of some voters will not spur 
additional participation, what will? For starters, it is important to 
acknowledge up front that opt-out voting is unlikely to increase 
participation among two sets of persons who lie at the extremes of voter 
participation. At one extreme, opt-out voting seems unlikely to increase 
participation among registered voters who have a strong preference for a 
particular candidate. Registered voters who have a strong preference for 
a particular candidate are going to cast a ballot whether they have a 
candidate pre-selected for them or not. At the other extreme, opt-out 
voting seems equally unlikely to increase participation among registered 
voters who absolutely do not care one bit about elections.
51
 If a 
registered voter has absolutely no concern about who wins an election 
then the registered voter will not care in the slightest about which 
candidate received her pre-selected vote. 
 
                                                          
 49. See DOWNS, supra note 12, at 265-66, 273-74. For a nice, succinct explanation of 
Downs‘s theory, see Grant M. Hayden, Abstention: The Unexpected Power of Withholding Your 
Vote, 43 CONN. L. REV. 585, 590 (2010). 
 50. See DOWNS, supra note 12, at 244. It is also worth noting that other registered voters who 
receive a ballot pre-selected for the candidate they prefer will not have any increased voting power. 
 51. Of course, a person who has absolutely no concern about who wins an election seems less 
likely to be registered to vote at all, and, importantly, opt-out voting only targets persons who are 
already registered. 
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The category of registered voters who will be nudged into voting 
should be registered voters who have relatively mild preferences—those 
who care a little bit about who wins an election, but not so much that 
they would definitely cast a ballot. More specifically, it will be those 
voters with relatively mild preferences who have a preference for one of 
the two leading candidates and have a strong preference against any of 
the ―minor‖ candidates. In theory, voters with a mild preference for one 
of the top two candidates seem likely to cast a ballot to prevent their 
ballot from going to the candidate who they strongly oppose. For 
example, take the 2008 general election ballot in Colorado. That ballot 
featured sixteen candidates for President (including, among others, the 
Prohibition, Socialist, Heartquake, Pacifist, and Objectivist Parties).
52
 If 
the votes in Colorado get divided up among these sixteen candidates, the 
odds for most registered voters are that the assigned ballot is going to 
reflect a ―fringe‖ candidate who they strongly oppose. This then makes it 
seem likely that they will switch their ballot to the candidate for whom 
they have a mild preference (which will likely be the Democratic or 
Republican candidate for president).
53
 
Another possibility as to why opt-out voting will increase turnout is 
that voters who know they are going to cast a ballot might have more 
incentive to gather information about the candidates to make sure they 
do not cast a ballot for a candidate that they abhor. Take, for example, a 
relatively typical example of a registered voter who regularly casts a 
ballot at a presidential election but rarely, if ever, casts a ballot at a local 
election. The registered voter may know next to nothing about the two 
candidates on the ballot for the local contest. However, to ensure a grave 
mistake is not made, that registered voter may well seek out information 
about the candidates. In gathering that information, the registered voter 
might then come to a conclusion about which candidate was their 
preference and cast the ballot accordingly. 
In some sense, the theory underlying the nudge toward participating 
because of being worried about voting for the ―wrong‖ candidate relies 
on registered voters wanting to feel good about themselves.
54
 For a long 
                                                          
 52. See Richard Winger, Colorado Presidential Ballot, with 16 Candidates, Is Most Crowded 
Ever for President in a General Election, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS (Oct. 2, 2008), http://www.ballot-
access.org/2008/10/02/colorado-presidential-ballot-with-16-candidates-is-most-crowded-ever-for-
president-in-a-general-election/. 
 53. To be sure, this could mean the impact of opt-out voting will diminish depending on the 
number of candidates in the mix. If the contest is only between a Republican and a Democrat, then 
voters with mild preferences for one or the other candidate may not have much of an increased 
incentive to participate. 
 54. See Donald P. Green & Alan S. Gerber, Introduction to Social Pressure and Voting: New 
Experimental Evidence, 32 POL. BEHAV. 331, 331 (2010). 
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time, scholars have puzzled over the irrationality of voting because the 
time and effort necessary to cast a ballot makes little sense in relation to 
the likelihood that a single vote will matter.
55
 One theory is that persons 
who cast ballots do so because of the intrinsic satisfaction achieved by 
voting and that the voters feel good about casting ballots.
56
 If that is the 
case, then perhaps by creating a possibility for individuals to feel bad 
about themselves by ignoring their pre-selected ballot and casting a 
ballot for a ―wrong‖ candidate, more registered voters will be spurred to 
want to feel good about themselves and, therefore, will participate. 
Another theory is that the approbation of others is an important aspect of 
individuals casting a ballot—that voters want to win approval rather than 
disapproval from their neighbors.
57
 If that is the case, then opt-out voting 
may create more opportunities for social pressure to not cast a ballot for 
the ―wrong‖ candidate—who would want to admit at a dinner party that 
she ignored her ballot and voted for the ―fringe‖ candidate? 
In short, the main promise of opt-out voting would seem to be an 
increase in participation by those who are less passionate about their 
preference at an election, but who would not want to be associated with 
a ―fringe‖ candidate. The potential for being stuck with a ―fringe‖ 
candidate might push such registered voters in high-profile contests, 
such as presidential elections, where the information cost is low, to 
ensure that their ballot is not cast for the ―wrong‖ person and, in doing 
so, cast their ballot for the ―right‖ person. The potential for being stuck 
with the ―wrong‖ candidate might also push registered voters in low-
profile contests (such as city council elections) where information costs 
are higher, to do some investigation of the candidates to ensure their 
ballot is not cast for the ―wrong‖ person and, in doing so, cast their 
ballot for the ―right‖ person. 
Before moving on, though, it is important to make clear that I am 
seeking to explore the potential for increased participation based on the 
pre-selection of a candidate aspect of opt-out voting. In recent years, 
some jurisdictions, most notably Oregon, have moved to all mail-ballot 
elections, and it is possible that mailing a ballot to every voter rather 
than using polling places would in and of itself increase participation.
58
 
                                                          
 55. See DOWNS, supra note 12, at 244-45. 
 56. Green & Gerber, supra note 54, at 331 (―One hypothesis is that people derive intrinsic 
satisfaction from casting their ballots. They either enjoy the act of voting per se or feel good about 
themselves for advancing a partisan cause or honoring a civic obligation.‖). 
 57. Id. (―In electoral systems where bribes and other material inducements are rare, incentives 
are thought to be social in nature: voters are rewarded by the approbation of others, while nonvoters 
are criticized or shunned.‖). 
 58. In theory, the fact that a registered voter receives a ballot by mail might increase 
participation in and of itself, although the political science research is mixed on this question. See 
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But that is not the point of this Article—the point is that the knowledge 
of a pre-selected candidate will provide registered voters with an extra 
nudge to cast ballots. 
While opt-out voting has the potential to increase participation 
among at least some voters, it is impossible to estimate the amount of 
increase in participation without further experimentation. It is, however, 
possible to do some basic theorizing about how much opt-out voting 
might change the level of participation at both high-profile and low-
profile elections. 
Starting with the highest profile election in the United States—the 
general presidential election—it is possible that opt-out voting would 
cause some increase in participation at this election. For example, in the 
2008 general presidential election—an election that featured one of the 
highest turnouts of the eligible voting population in recent years
59—the 
U.S. Census Bureau Reports noted that a little more than fifteen million 
registered voters did not turn out.
60
 Presumably, then, some portion of 
those fifteen million registered voters might have participated in an opt-
out voting system, although it is admittedly uncertain exactly how many 
of these registered voters would be spurred to participate through a 
system of opt-out voting. 
Lower-profile elections, though, would seem to be the arena in 
which opt-out voting would probably have the greatest impact on 
increasing turnout. For example, participation in primary elections tends 
to be lower than in the general elections.
61
 In addition, the farther one 
proceeds down the ladder of electoral contests, the lower the turnout 
                                                          
generally Thad Kousser & Megan Mullin, Will Vote-by-Mail Elections Increase Participation?: 
Evidence from California Counties, U.C. SAN DIEGO, http://weber.ucsd.edu/~tkousser/Will%20 
Vote-by-Mail%20Elections%20Increase%20Turnout.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2011) (noting that 
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 59. Marisam, supra note 48. 
 60. Table 1. Reported Voting and Registration, by Sex and Single Years of Age: November 
2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/voting/cps2008/Table% 
2001.xls (last visited Oct. 28, 2011). The number of registered voters who did not participate in the 
2004 general presidential election are similar. See KELLY HOLDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING 
AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2004, 3 fig.1 (Mar. 2006), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p20-556.pdf (showing that a little more than sixteen million 
registered voters did not participate in the November 2004 election). 
 61. For an example of the general phenomenon of lower turnout in primaries than in general 
elections, see generally Ferrel Guillory, Primary Turnout Data: Findings, N.C. DATA-NET (Apr. 
2008), http://southnow.org/southnow-publications/nc-datanet/DataNet%20April08.pdf (discussing 
and providing tables of turnout for primary and general elections in North Carolina).  
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typically tends to be.
62
 When it comes to other elections—congressional, 
state legislative, and local—turnout tends to become quite small.63 Thus, 
these elections have an even greater pool of current non-participants who 
might be nudged into participating through a system of opt-out voting. 
While opt-out voting has the promise of increasing participation—
particularly in lower-profile contests—it is important to recognize that 
opt-out voting is not going to result in anything near 100 percent 
participation in U.S. elections. In order to preserve an individual‘s 
freedom to choose not to participate, opt-out voting is not tethered to any 
sort of system of mandatory voter registration. Without mandatory 
registration, it is not expected that turnout at elections among the voting 
eligible population would reach levels upward of ninety percent.
64
 
Moreover, the vast majority of registered voters already participate in 
the highest profile election in the United States—the general presidential 
election.
65
 
And even just within the pool of registered voters, opt-out voting 
will not cause all registered voters to participate and, indeed, might 
cause some registered voters who are currently participating to do 
otherwise. For one thing, a certain amount of registered voters who 
currently do not participate would likely just tune out all elections. Some 
of them will take their pre-selected ballots and just throw them out like 
they are another piece of junk mail. Moreover, some of those registered 
voters who are already casting ballots may just ignore their ballots 
because they do not have to perform any work. Put differently, it is at 
least possible that opt-out voting could induce laziness on the part of 
currently active participants. While this seems counter-intuitive—after 
all, if you are currently going through the effort of casting a ballot, why 
would making it easier to register your preferences cause you to 
participate less?—it is at least a possibility that must be considered. 
In the end, though, opt-out voting seems like a plausible way to 
increase participation. Of course, opt-out voting is not the only way 
                                                          
 62. Zoltan L. Hajnal & Paul G. Lewis, Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local 
Elections, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 645, 645-46 (2003). 
 63. See ZOLTAN L. HAJNAL ET AL., MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA: TURNOUT, 
TIMING, AND COMPETITION 16 (2002) [hereinafter MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA] (finding 
that on average only about thirty percent of the voting age population turns out in local elections in 
California); Hajnal & Lewis, supra note 62 (―Nowhere is the turnout problem worse than at the 
local level.‖). 
 64. Participation reaches nintey percent in places such as Australia that have universal voter 
registration combined with compulsory voting. See Katherine M. Swenson, Note, Sticks, Carrots, 
Donkey Votes, and True Choice: A Rationale for Abolishing Compulsory Voting in Australia, 16 
MINN. J. INT‘L. L. 525, 528 (2007). 
 65. Halperin, supra note 46, at 72 (providing statistics on the turnout of registered voters at 
general presidential elections). 
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participation might be increased and there is one proposal for increasing 
turnout that merits substantial discussion here: compulsory voting.
66
 
B. Increasing Participation Without Being Too Heavy-Handed 
There is a more sure-fire proposal to increase participation and to 
(probably) not lose current participants: adopt a system of compulsory 
voting that forces every voting eligible citizen to participate.
67
 
Approximately a few dozen democracies employ some type of 
compulsory voting system.
68
 For instance, Australia requires every 
citizen eighteen-years-of-age or older to register to vote and to cast a 
ballot at each election.
69
 After the election, persons who have not voted 
must either provide a valid reason for not voting or pay a fine of twenty 
dollars.
70
 Indeed, some commentators have trumpeted compulsory 
voting as a solution to the United States‘s turnout problem.71 
Despite an inability to create the possibly dramatic difference in 
turnout that compulsory voting would bring, opt-out voting might be a 
superior system to compulsory voting on a number of levels. First, to the 
extent that one argument against compulsory voting is that citizens are 
deprived of the choice not to vote,
72
 opt-out voting solves this dilemma 
by not making voting entirely compulsory. A ballot would still only be 
issued to those voters who had chosen to register—a group of citizens 
who had already expressed some interest in democratic participation. 
                                                          
 66. See Note, supra note 6, at 596-98 (discussing the benefits of compulsory voting). 
 67. Certainly there may be other ways to increase participation. For instance, expanding 
registration opportunities might help in this regard. See generally Tokaji, supra note 28 (discussing 
possible reforms to increase voter registration). And these proposals may well be a good idea. I have 
chosen to compare opt-out voting to compulsory voting because opt-out voting seems most similar 
to compulsory voting and would serve as a substitute to compulsory voting. 
 68. Compulsory Voting, INT‘L IDEA, http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2011) (listing countries that have some form of compulsory voting). 
 69. Electoral Backgrounder: Compulsory Voting, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMM‘N, 1 (Apr. 
2010), http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/backgrounders/files/2010-eb-compulsory-
voting.pdf. There are some limited exceptions to the requirement to register and vote. For instance, 
persons serving a prison sentence of three years or longer are not allowed to register or vote. Id. at 
2. 
 70. Id. at 3. Valid reasons for not voting include religious objection and physical sickness. Id. 
at 3-4. For a more complete description of the Australian system, see Swenson, supra note 64, at 
533-36. 
 71. See Lijphart, supra note 6, at 10. 
 72. Anthony Ciccone, The Constitutional Right to Vote is Not a Duty, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. 
& POL‘Y 325, 348 (2002) (―The right to choose not to vote is a choice in and of itself. A nonvoter 
should not be punished for abstaining from voting.‖); H. B. Mayo, A Note on the Alleged Duty to 
Vote, 21 J. POL. 319, 320 (1959) (―[T]he right not to vote is often admitted to be legitimate . . . .‖); 
Note, supra note 6, at 598 (―One of the chief objections to any compulsory voting law is that it 
violates a purported right not to vote.‖). 
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Second, opt-out voting is not even compulsory for registered voters. 
While registered voters would have an automatic preference generated 
for them, registered voters could still opt out of choosing a candidate by 
selecting ―None of the Above.‖73 In short, to the extent that arguments 
against compulsory voting invoke notions of the freedom,
74
 liberty,
75
 
and, perhaps, a constitutional right not to vote
76—opt-out voting does 
not raise those concerns because it still gives individuals the ability to 
remain on the sidelines.
77
 
Compulsory voting has also been criticized as having the potential 
to introduce into the electorate a pool of uninterested and uninformed 
voters,
78
 but opt-out voting should mitigate this problem for several 
reasons. For starters, because opt-out voting would only involve voters 
who have already registered, then presumably opt-out voting only 
includes those citizens who have at least some interest in electoral 
participation. In addition, opt-out voting, like compulsory voting, might 
provide the necessary nudge for voters to educate themselves. 
Individuals might have a different reason to gather information about the 
candidates if they know they will be voting rather than if they know they 
                                                          
 73. Presumably, another strategy for non-participation would be to intentionally ―spoil‖ the 
ballot by, for example, casting a vote for both candidates in a head-to-head contest. 
 74. Lijphart, supra note 6, at 11 (―Probably the most serious objection to compulsory voting 
is normative in nature: compulsory voting may be an attractive partial solution to the conflict 
between the democratic ideals of participation and equality, but it is often said to violate a third 
democratic ideal, that of individual freedom.‖); Colantuono, supra note 45, at 1503 (―Compulsory 
voting is fundamentally inconsistent with the individualism of American political culture . . . .‖); 
Swenson, supra note 64, at 536 (―[C]ompelling a person to cast a ballot is antithetical to the 
democratic value of individual freedom.‖). 
 75. Carmichael, supra note 6, at 310 (―It is likely that some people will oppose this proposal 
[of mandatory voting] because they believe that it interferes with their liberty not to vote.‖); Heather 
Lardy, Is There a Right Not to Vote?, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 307 (2004) (discussing how 
the right not to vote includes an argument about ―preserving individual liberty‖); Matsler, supra 
note 6, at 966 (noting the argument that ―compulsory voting violates the ethic of personal volition 
which is said to be at the heart of a democratic government‖). 
 76. Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2176 n.163 (1996) 
(―[O]ne might raise First Amendment objections: Forcing someone to vote arguably is tantamount 
to requiring speech.‖); Halperin, supra note 46, at 103 (―[T]he Supreme Court would most likely 
strike down a compulsory voting system as unconstitutional—and rightly so.‖); Matsler, supra note 
6, at 969 (―Domestic critics of compulsory voting will almost surely bring a challenge based upon 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.‖); Note, supra note 6, at 601-03 (discussing 
an argument that compulsory voting violates the First Amendment right to free speech); Jonas 
Lerman, Voting Rites: Deliberative Democracy and Compulsory Voting in the United States 28 
(June 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1600929 (arguing 
compulsory voting may violate the Fifth Amendment‘s substantive due process protections). 
 77. See Matsler, supra note 6, at 973-74 (noting that allowing a person to opt out of 
government compelled speech should help lead to a finding that no First Amendment violation 
exists). 
 78. Note, supra note 6, at 607-08. 
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might be voting. Put simply, opt-out voting might weed out the persons 
who truly do not care substantively about an election in a way that 
compulsory voting might not.
79
 
Yet compulsory voting does have something going for it that opt-
out voting does not: simplicity. Compulsory voting is easy to understand 
and, at least at first blush, appears to do less violence to the United 
States‘s existing system of balloting.80 In contrast, opt-out voting 
involves more nuance and complexity, and seems to fundamentally alter 
the mechanism of balloting. In essence, there is likely to be even more 
―instinctive‖ opposition to opt-out voting than to compulsory voting. For 
this reason, compulsory voting may well be superior to opt-out voting 
because compulsory voting may represent a more pragmatic solution to 
the United States‘s turnout problem. 
That said, to the extent that opt-out voting does not force anyone to 
vote and seems less likely to introduce a pool of totally disinterested 
persons casting ballots, over the long haul it might turn into a more 
pragmatic solution than compulsory voting. One of the general 
objections to compulsory voting is that it is not ―sellable‖ to the 
                                                          
 79. Opt-out voting may also solve some of the principal administrative problems with 
compulsory voting. For instance, compulsory voting may require a costly enforcement scheme. Id. 
at 609 (―One of the major costs would be enforcement of the compulsory voting laws.‖). For 
example, in Australia, election officials have to perform a post-election investigation and assess 
fines against voters who do not have a valid excuse for not voting. See supra notes 69-70 and 
accompanying text. However, because opt-out voting does not legally require participation, no 
costly enforcement mechanism is required. But see Patricia Funk, Is There An Expressive Function 
of Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws with Symbolic Fines, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 135, 
138, 155 (2007) (theorizing, but not necessarily proving definitively, that monetary penalties had no 
impact on turnout in relation to Switzerland‘s compulsory voting laws). 
  Opt-out voting may also solve another administrative problem with compulsory voting—
persons who have absolutely no interest in voting influencing the election by merely choosing the 
candidate at the top of the ballot. This is the so-called ―ballot-order effect.‖ See Alvarez et al., supra 
note 10, at 41-42. What can happen is that a person who has no interest in voting but is compelled to 
do so may just go into the voting booth and punch all the names at the top of the list of candidates. 
See id. In Australia, a very vivid term has been used to describe ―apathetic voters who attended the 
polls dutifully, but blindly numbered their ballots from top to bottom, down the traditional, 
alphabetically ordered card‖—donkey voters. Graeme Orr, Ballot Order: Donkey Voting in 
Australia, 1 ELECTION L.J. 573, 573 (2002). 
  While it is not feasible to claim that absolutely no ―donkey voting‖ will occur with opt-out 
voting, the effects should be minimal. Instead of affirmatively selecting the candidate at the top of 
the ballot, registered voters who receive a ballot will just do nothing. With the random assignment 
of candidates to registered voters, apathetic voters who do not care might just cancel each other out. 
At the very least, there would seem to be much less of an inherent advantage to being the top name 
on the ballot. Additionally, another safeguard against donkey voting would include printing ballots 
that randomly moved the placement of candidates from top to bottom. 
  Admittedly, though, while opt-out voting may solve some of the administrative problems 
with compulsory voting, opt-out voting may create other administrative problems that will be 
considered in more detail later. See supra Part IV. 
 80. See Swenson, supra note 64, at 527-29. 
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American public, in part because of a generally libertarian bent related to 
governmental interference in the individual choice to cast a ballot.
81
 Opt-
out voting, however, preserves America‘s libertarian culture by 
preserving the choice to not vote. Therefore, opt-out voting might 
ultimately be more sellable and in some sense represent a compromise 
position between compulsory voting and the current system of 
participation in the United States. Put differently, while it is true that 
opt-out voting, like compulsory voting, is not pragmatic at this precise 
moment, it could morph into the more pragmatic option. 
Regardless of whether opt-out voting could ever be adopted, it 
theoretically represents a significant step toward improving voter turnout 
in the United States, particularly in contests below the general 
presidential election. Moreover, opt-out voting might well be superior to 
the leading alternative proposal to increase turnout: a system of 
compulsory voting. But to assert that opt-out voting will increase 
participation in a manner superior to compulsory voting begs an 
important question as to whether we should seek to increase 
participation and, if so, why? 
C. Why Increase Participation? 
There is an almost instinctive intuition that high voter turnout is 
better for democracy. Indeed, it is relatively rare to hear anyone publicly 
suggesting that the United States should have lower turnout. Even if 
certain proposals in the realm of election administration seem to have as 
one of the goals limiting the ability of registered voters to cast ballots, 
such as proposals to require voters to present photo identification at the 
polls, it is rare to hear anyone publicly endorse such a proposal on these 
grounds. Rather, such proposals will be championed in the name of 
fraud prevention or to achieve other non-disfranchising goals.
82
 In some 
                                                          
 81. Hasen, supra note 76, at 2138 (―Enactment of a compulsory voting law in the United 
States, even if desirable as a method of overcoming collective action problems, and even if proven 
effective as a means of increasing turnout in other states, is unlikely to occur because of a widely 
held libertarian belief against government interference in the decision to vote.‖). Cf. RUY A. 
TEIXEIRA, THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 154 (1992) (describing compulsory voting as 
―antithetical to American values . . . .‖); Marisam, supra note 48, at 207 (noting that compulsory 
voting ―is not politically feasible in this country‖); Tokaji, supra note 28, at 505 (―Despite the 
advantages of compulsory registration and voting, it seems highly unlikely that there will be a 
national mandate for it anytime soon.‖); Colantuono, supra note 45, at 1503 (―[I]t seems doubtful 
that Americans would accept such a plan [of compulsory voting].‖); Matsler, supra note 6, at 976 
(―[T]here remains a nearly common sense belief that compulsory voting simply will not happen in 
the United States.‖). 
 82. See generally Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631 (2007) 
(describing arguments for photo identification laws). 
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ways, publicly advocating for fewer voters participating would be akin 
to questioning the Supreme Court‘s decisions that created the doctrine of 
one person, one vote; it is just not done without being subjected to 
criticism that such a view lies far outside the mainstream.
83
 
Yet beyond the generalized sentiment that increased voter 
participation is generally healthy for democracy, perhaps the best reason 
for increasing participation is to create a more representative 
electorate.
84
 In the United States, low voter participation appears to 
generally create a less representative electorate—especially when it 
comes to local elections.
85
 In essence, turnout in the United States skews 
toward greater participation by those who are more educated and 
wealthy, and lower participation by the poor and the less educated 
(which often correlates with racial and ethnic minority status).
86
 
                                                          
 83. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, Question for Judge Alito: What About One Person One Vote?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2006, at A16 (―Rejecting the one-person-one-vote principle is a radical 
position.‖); Linda Greenhouse, Legal Establishment Divided Over Bork Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 26, 1987, at 33 (noting how Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork was pilloried for his 
criticism of one person, one vote). 
 84. It is also possible that increasing participation will make government more legitimate in 
the eyes of the citizenry. Swenson, supra note 64, at 527 (recognizing the argument that ―low voter 
turnouts undermine the legitimacy of a democratic government, while large voter turnouts enhance 
it‖); see also Hajnal & Lewis, supra note 62, at 646 (―The fact that so few citizens participate in 
local elections is likely to be at least a contributing factor to the decreasing levels of trust in 
government, political efficacy, and sense of civic duty that have alarmed so many observers of 
American politics.‖); Lijphart, supra note 6, at 2 n.2 (―Of course, another crucially important reason 
to aim for maximum turnout is democratic legitimacy.‖); Marisam, supra note 48, at 193 (―The 
essence of the argument for why high voter turnout matters starts with the premise that democracy 
depends on some level of self-determination and governmental legitimacy. High turnout is one 
legitimating factor.‖); Note, supra note 6, at 594 (―There are serious questions about how legitimate 
a government is when the vast majority of citizens have not elected it.‖). 
 85. J. Eric Oliver & Shang E. Ha, Vote Choice in Suburban Elections, 101 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 393, 395 (2007) (―Electoral turnout is significantly lower in local elections, particularly when 
they are nonconcurrent with presidential or congressional election cycles. Voters in off-cycle 
elections are less representative of the general population and are more likely to be those 
‗stakeholders‘ within their communities, that is, parents of school-age children and older, home-
owning, long-term residents.‖ (internal citations omitted)). 
 86. KEYSSAR, supra note 48, at 320 (―[T]urnout is lowest among the poor, minorities, and the 
less well-educated.‖); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 48, at 3 (―[T]hose who vote are different in 
politically important respects from those who do not. Voters are better off and better educated, and 
nonvoters are poorer and less well educated. . . . In sum, the active American electorate 
overrepresents those who have more and under-represents those who have less.‖ (footnote 
omitted)); Zoltan Hajnal & Jessica Trounstine, Where Turnout Matters: The Consequences of 
Uneven Turnout in City Politics, 67 J. POL. 515, 515 (2005) (―Study after study of American 
elections has found that individuals with ample resources vote much more regularly than those with 
few resources—the poor, racial, and ethnic minorities and the less educated.‖); Hasen, supra note 
76, at 2165 (―Wealthier, better-educated whites are more likely to vote than other groups in 
society.‖); Lijphart, supra note 6, at 2 (―[L]ow voter turnout means unequal and socioeconomically 
biased turnout. This pattern is so clear, strong, and well known in the United States that it does not 
need to be belabored further.‖); Marisam, supra note 48, at 193 (noting the existence of consistently 
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This lower participation by certain segments of society can have 
negative consequences. For instance, one commentator has noted how 
lower participation by certain groups can ―grievously compromise the 
inclusiveness of the resulting democracy.‖87 If certain groups do not 
vote, or vote at a lesser rate, government officials are less likely to pay 
attention to their needs.
88
 Put differently, if the composition of the 
electorate differs from the make-up of the citizenry in general, then 
government policy may be unfairly skewed toward those who actually 
cast ballots.
89
 
Some question exists, though, as to whether lower participation 
among certain groups in American society makes a difference in 
electoral outcomes and government policies.
90
 Some political science 
studies have concluded that voters and non-voters in the United States 
do not have substantially different views.
91
 Relatedly, a number of 
studies have also concluded that outcomes of elections would not be 
different if turnout increased.
92
 A review of these studies might lead to 
the conclusion that it does not make sense to increase turnout with the 
goal of making government more responsive to the citizenry. 
Yet context may make a difference in terms of representativeness 
and election outcomes. The University of San Diego‘s Zoltan Hajnal and 
Princeton‘s Jessica Trounstine have noted that most of the studies that 
discount the impact of low turnout on the results of elections and 
governmental policies focus on high-profile national elections, such as 
                                                          
lower voter participation among socio-economically disadvantaged groups). 
 87. FREDERIC CHARLES SCHAFFER, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF CLEAN ELECTION REFORM 9 
(2008). 
 88. V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 527 (1984) (―The blunt truth 
is that politicians and officials are under no compulsion to pay much heed to classes and groups of 
citizens that do not vote.‖). 
 89. See Hajnal & Trounstine, supra note 86, at 515. 
 90. See Lijphart, supra note 6, at 4-5 (describing this debate). 
 91. See Benjamin Highton & Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Political Implications of Higher 
Turnout, 31 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 179, 192 (2001) (―Taken as a whole, non-voters appear well 
represented by those who vote.‖); see also Michael M. Gant & William Lyons, Democratic Theory, 
Nonvoting, and Public Policy: The 1972-1988 Presidential Elections, 21 AM. POL. Q. 185, 199 
(1993) (―Our analysis has indicated that voters and nonvoters differ on a few policy positions over 
the years, but not by much, and in fact do not differ on most issues.‖). 
 92. See Highton & Wolfinger, supra note 91, at 179 (―Simply put, voters‘ preferences differ 
minimally from those of all citizens; outcomes would not change if everyone voted.‖); see also 
Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, Voters, Non-Voters and the Implications of Election 
Timing for Public Policy 3 (Chi. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 536, 2010), 
available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/536-324-jg-voters.pdf (concluding that 
―substantial increases in voter participation would not substantially alter the outcomes of the 
democratic process‖). But see Jack Citrin et al., What if Everyone Voted? Simulating the Impact of 
Increased Turnout in Senate Elections, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 75, 83 (2003) (finding that full turnout 
would change a few electoral outcomes for U.S. Senate). 
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for president and Congress.
93
 They found that skewed turnout does 
matter in some elections; namely, local elections.
94
 As they wrote: ―By 
shifting the focus of attention to local contests, we find that turnout 
matters. Changes in the percentage of voters who turn out can and do 
alter mayoral election outcomes and racial representation on city 
councils.‖95 
Low turnout in local races might also shift policy outcomes.
96
 In 
one study, a comparison was done between school districts in Texas that 
held their elections in conjunction with national elections and those 
school districts that did not—with the former districts differing from the 
latter because a higher turnout of voters occurs when local elections are 
held in conjunction with national elections.
97
 The study hypothesized 
that certain interest groups—namely teachers—would be advantaged by 
the lower voter turnout and that this advantage would translate into 
better policy outcomes for teachers from the school boards elected at a 
time that did not coincide with a national election.
98
 Indeed, this seemed 
to be true as the study found that on average, teacher salary growth was 
a little more than one percent higher in school districts with low turnout 
elections.
99
 
In short, while some question exists as to whether an increase in 
turnout would make a difference to election outcomes and government 
policies on the national level; the evidence suggests that an increase in 
turnout would make a difference to election outcomes and government 
policies on the local level.
100
 For this reason, opt-out voting—to the 
extent it increases participation, especially on the local level—should be 
supported because it helps increase the representativeness of the 
electorate. 
 
                                                          
 93. Hajnal & Trounstine, supra note 86, at 517 (―[T]he nonimpact of a skewed electorate 
stems in part from the narrow focus of the existing empirical research. Nearly every study that looks 
at the effect of voter turnout on electoral outcomes focuses on the national electorate in presidential 
and Congressional elections.‖). 
 94. Id. at 530-32. 
 95. Id. at 518. 
 96. See ZOLTAN J. HAJNAL, AMERICA‘S UNEVEN DEMOCRACY: RACE, TURNOUT, AND 
REPRESENTATION IN CITY POLITICS 175 (2010) (―[T]here is evidence that turnout is closely linked 
to the policies that governments pursue. Municipalities with higher turnout spend more on welfare 
and other redistributive programs favored by minorities and less on areas favored by more 
advantaged white interests.‖). 
 97. See generally Sarah F. Anzia, The Election Timing Effect: Evidence from a Policy 
Intervention in Texas (Jan. 5, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.stanford. 
edu/~sanzia/Anzia_Texas_1_5_11.pdf (analyzing a study on off-cycle and on-cycle elections). 
 98. Id. at 8-9. 
 99. Id. at 28-29. 
 100. See HAJNAL, supra note 96, at 175. 
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It is also possible that increasing turnout will increase the 
representativeness of the electorate in another way that might help put a 
dent in one of the major ills of the current political discourse in America: 
polarization.
101
 The electorate and the parties have become more 
polarized—some might say hyper-polarized—by playing more and more 
to the extremes and crowding out the center.
102
 This has a negative 
impact on political discourse and can serve to diminish participation by 
those citizens who have less extreme views.
103
 Importantly, the citizens 
who are currently being left out of the mix in terms of political 
participation tend to be less connected to the two major political 
parties.
104
 Put another way, the citizens who are most engaged in politics 
and turn out to vote also tend to be the most extremist in terms of 
political outlook. 
Opt-out voting might bring additional centrist voters into the mix 
for at least several reasons. First, as previously explicated, it should 
nudge persons with less strong preferences—those less solidly connected 
to the two major political parties—to participate. Second, opt-out voting 
should nudge the political parties and political elites in a different 
direction that might cause them to refocus their efforts in a manner more 
positive for American politics. Because the baseline has changed from 
non-participation to participation for voters with mild preferences, 
political elites might become incentivized to attract those voters.
105
 And, 
if in order to attract less extreme voters, parties and political elites need 
to change their policies and tactics, then the American political discourse 
might become less polarized. Third, opt-out voting might push political 
parties away from strategies aimed at decreasing voter participation. 
Currently, one potential strategy for winning an election is to drive down 
turnout among the electorate through tactics such as negative 
                                                          
 101. Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized 
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 275 (2011) (―American democracy over the last 
generation has had one defining attribute: extreme partisan polarization.‖). 
 102. See id. at 276-78, 281. 
 103. See Galston, supra note 6, at 6-7. 
 104. Id. at 7 (―[L]ess partisan citizens . . . tend to be more weakly connected to the political 
system . . . .‖); Marisam, supra note 48, at 213 (―Election after election, those who self-identify as 
strong partisans vote at higher rates than those who consider themselves weak partisans or 
nonpartisans.‖); Pildes, supra note 101, at 279 (―Non-voters . . . tend to clump toward the middle of 
the liberal-conservative spectrum—liberal on some issues, conservative on others. More generally, 
it is the least informed, least politically active, and least engaged citizens who are the most centrist.‖ 
(footnote omitted)); Matsler, supra note 6, at 956 (―In 2000, American nonvoters were most likely 
younger, less educated, poorer, and less connected to either of the two major political parties than 
their voting counterparts.‖ (emphasis added)). 
 105. Cf. SARAH BIRCH, FULL PARTICIPATION 59 (2009) (noting that the ―most obvious impact 
of compulsory voting on campaign activities is the fact that institutionally-enforced universal 
participation shifts the main aim of political parties from mobilization to conversion‖). 
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advertising.
106
 With opt-out voting, there is a stronger possibility for all 
registered voters
107
 to turn out, thus reducing the incentive for political 
actors to depress turnout.
108
 
It is important, though, to not be naïve or oversell the potential of 
opt-out voting. Opt-out voting is unlikely to completely change political 
polarization as we know it. There are other aspects of the electoral 
system, such as redistricting by incumbent politicians
109
 and campaign 
finance laws,
110
 which might also cause centrist voters to abandon 
politics. Put differently, in evaluating opt-out voting, one should 
recognize it is not a cure-all for every ill of our electoral politics, but it 
might help salve some of the existing wounds. Moreover, it is also 
theoretically possible that opt-out voting could increase political 
polarization at the state and local level. The promise of increasing the 
percentage of ballots cast by the electorate is greatest in state and local 
elections because that is where turnout is lowest.
111
 However, it is 
possible that the additional persons spurred to vote in state and local 
elections would be the most partisan persons who are currently 
participating in federal elections. 
In the final analysis, opt-out voting seems likely to enhance 
participation among the electorate. This enhancement of participation 
would likely be most marked when it comes to electoral contests below 
the level of a general presidential election, and enhanced participation 
alone would be a positive for American democracy by making the 
electorate more representative and perhaps decreasing political 
polarization. However, a system of opt-out voting might not be entirely 
positive, and it is to the possible downsides and objections to opt-out 
voting to which we now turn. 
                                                          
 106. See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: HOW ATTACK 
ADS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE 48-51 (1995). 
 107. Of course, it would be important to be vigilant to ensure that political parties do not 
engage in other tactics, such as more restrictive voter registration procedures, in an effort to limit 
participation. 
 108. It is possible a political party or candidate would try to channel registered voters who are 
potentially going to vote against their candidate into ignoring their ballots. It is also possible that a 
political party or candidate would try to channel registered voters who are potentially going to vote 
against their candidate into casting a ballot for ―None of the Above.‖ But these would be tricky 
strategies for at least a couple of reasons. First, it would be odd to send the direct message to not 
vote or to vote for no one. Second, to the extent one could create a more implicit campaign targeted 
at one‘s potential opponents, it could easily backfire and lead to one‘s own mild supporters to do the 
same. 
 109. See Pildes, supra note 101, at 311. 
 110. See id. at 324-25. 
 111. See Hajnal & Lewis, supra note 62, at 646. 
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IV. DRAWBACKS AND BARRIERS TO OPT-OUT VOTING 
If it is a mistake to oversell opt-out voting as a magic pill to solve 
all of the United States‘s political ills, it would be an even greater 
mistake to pretend opt-out voting might not have any downsides. And it 
would be the greatest mistake of all to think that opt-out voting could 
easily be introduced at an election held tomorrow. This Part tackles 
many of the problems opt-out voting presents, beginning with theoretical 
objections to opt-out voting and then moving to more concrete 
objections related to actually administering such a system on the ground. 
Of course, in presenting these potential objections, I also discuss 
possible counter-responses in defense of opt-out voting. 
A. Theoretical Objections to Opt-Out Voting 
The theoretical objections to opt-out voting can very roughly be 
demarcated in two ways. The first line of objections relate to how opt-
out voting might change the character of the electorate on a very general 
level. Here, the problem mainly focuses on the debate about whether low 
turnout represents a problem at all and whether efforts should be made to 
make voting more convenient. The second line of objections relates to 
how opt-out voting might impact individual voters and elections in very 
specific contests. 
1.   Concerns About Changing the Electorate Generally 
The most obvious theoretical objection that might be brought 
against opt-out voting would take issue with the premise that low turnout 
at elections represents any problem at all.
112 Citizens may not be casting 
ballots because they are satisfied with the status quo—who needs to go 
to the polls when life is copacetic?
113
 Citizens may also not be turning 
out because they are indifferent to the results of the elections. If 
government does not seem meaningful in my life, then what does it 
matter who my president, senator, or local dog-catcher is?
114
 Essentially, 
                                                          
 112. Mayo, supra note 72, at 321 (―Instead, therefore, of preaching the duty to act as a political 
animal to those who have no inclination that way and would do it badly if compelled, it may well be 
wiser to leave them to cultivate their private gardens, and to rely merely upon the experience of 
democracies that there is always in fact a wide enough interest in politics and voting to work the 
political machinery.‖). 
 113. Robert W. Jackman, Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial 
Democracies, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 405, 406 (1987) (―[T]here is a venerable literature claiming 
that low participation may testify to satisfaction, and that high turnout is undesirable.‖). 
 114. Some might object that high turnout can lead to terrible results. The infamous example is 
the last years of the Weimar Republic that eventually led to Nazi control. HERBERT TINGSTEN, 
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: STUDIES IN ELECTION STATISTICS 225 (1975); see also Mayo, supra note 72, 
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low turnout may not be a problem that needs to be addressed because 
those who do not vote are either happy or indifferent.
115
 
Assuming the accuracy of this somewhat contestable premise of 
happiness/indifference,
116
 opt-out voting should do little harm on this 
score. Citizens who are satisfied with the status quo will have a very 
easy way in which to register their satisfaction: some of them will be 
assigned the incumbent and need to do nothing; those who are assigned 
to a non-incumbent will merely have to switch their ballot to the 
incumbent. Voters who think elections have no meaning can simply cast 
their ballot for ―None of the Above.‖117 Put simply, opt-out voting 
should not create significant issues for registered voters who are satisfied 
with government or who do not care about government—registered 
voters in these categories should have no more difficulty with opt-out 
voting than they have with the current system of balloting in the United 
States. 
Of course, registered voters who do not turn out could well be 
unhappy and alienated. Even so, low turnout may be desirable (and any 
higher turnout created by opt-out voting undesirable) because those who 
participate are the best-informed voters and increasing participation by 
less informed voters might dilute the voting talent pool.
118
 As John 
Stuart Mill once said ―[a] man who does not care whether he votes is not 
likely to care much which way he votes; and he who is in that state of 
mind has no moral right to vote at all . . . .‖119 Or, as a slightly more 
recent commentator has put it: ―an unwilling or indifferent vote is a 
                                                          
at 321 n.4 (―My own impression is that . . . there has always been wide, almost feverish public 
interest in politics and voting in countries where democracy collapsed, e.g., in the Weimar 
Republic; and that democracy has been lost not through voter apathy, but because it has been 
overthrown by non-democratic parties, e.g., by Nazis in Germany . . . .‖). However, research 
indicates that ―‗[t]he data favor the theorists who believe that citizen involvement enhances 
legitimacy‘ instead of producing democratic breakdown.‖ Lijphart, supra note 6, at 10 (quoting G. 
BINGHAM POWELL, JR., CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES: PARTICIPATION, STABILITY, AND 
VIOLENCE 206 (1982)). 
 115. See Jackman, supra note 113, at 406. 
 116. As Piven and Cloward have written: ―Of course, no one has offered an adequate 
explanation of why this ‗politics of happiness‘ is consistently concentrated among the least well 
off.‖ PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 48, at 3 (footnote omitted). 
 117. One of the potential promises of opt-out voting would be to lower the number of citizens 
who think the government is not meaningful by providing an incentive for these citizens to gather 
some knowledge that could lead them to conclude that government and elections can be meaningful. 
Cf. HAJNAL, supra note 96, at 179 (―The act of voting provides citizens with an extra incentive to 
engage in information gathering. Indeed, research suggests that active participation encourages 
citizens to learn more about the functioning of government and the issues that are currently under 
debate.‖). 
 118. See JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 165 
(Currin V. Shields ed., 1958). 
 119. Id. 
924 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:897 
thoughtless one . . . .‖120 By making it more difficult to vote, we perhaps 
get a ―better‖ electorate in terms of more politically informed voters.121 
In this way, it is positive to have some barriers to casting a ballot and 
opt-out voting may break down too many of those barriers. 
Indeed, some empirical research lends support to the argument that 
higher turnout at elections may just lead to additional voters casting 
uninformed votes. For instance, one pair of researchers found that in 
suburban elections—where voter turnout tends to be low—those who 
cast ballots were generally well-informed voters.
122
 Another study of 
compulsory voting compared voters who were compelled to vote with 
voters who would not have voted absent the compulsory voting 
regime.
123
 That study determined that those forced to cast ballots by 
compulsory voting were ―less inclined to make their decisions in a way 
that coherently reflects their issue preferences‖ and that this increases 
the likelihood that an election outcome ―will not accurately reflect the 
distribution of voter preferences.‖124 In addition, less informed voters 
might be more likely to cast ballots in favor of incumbents merely 
because of name recognition, or might be more likely to cast a ballot 
based solely upon the racial identity of the candidates.
125
 In essence, 
there are some plausible reasons to think that higher turnout could result 
in a less informed electorate and less accurate elections.
126
 
                                                          
 120. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, COMPULSORY VOTING 21 (1955). 
 121. Cf. Hasen, supra note 76, at 2174 (―Perhaps the strongest instrumental argument against 
compulsory voting is that it would lead to poorer decisionmaking by the electorate . . . [because] 
[a]lthough the law would mandate casting a ballot, it would not mandate becoming an informed 
voter before doing so.‖). 
 122. Oliver & Ha, supra note 85, at 404 (―[S]uburban voters exhibit very high levels of interest 
and involvement in local affairs. Among this group of active participants, vote choice is driven more 
by specific issue concerns than either subjective impressions of candidates or knee-jerk adherence to 
party positions.‖). Importantly, though, the authors of this study recognize the downside to low 
turnout in suburban elections. Id. (―Suburbanization may empower one element of the 
population . . . but further disenfranchise the already most marginalized portions of the citizenry.‖). 
Cf. Gant & Lyons, supra note 91, at 190, 199 (finding that voters are more likely than non-voters to 
base their votes on policy preferences rather than other factors such as the personalities of the 
candidates and partisanship). 
 123. Peter Selb & Romain Lachat, The More the Better? Counterfactual Evidence on the Effect 
of Compulsory Voting on the Consistency of Party Choice, 48 EUR. J. POL. RES. 573, 577-78 (2009). 
 124. Id. at 589, 591. 
 125. Ned Augenblick & Scott Nicholson, Ballot Position, Choice Fatigue, and Voter Behavior 
7 (July 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ned/Choice_Fatigue.pdf. 
 126. Cf. Keith Jakee & Guang-Zhen Sun, Is Compulsory Voting More Democratic?, 129 PUB. 
CHOICE 61, 69 (2006). Jakee and Sun argue: 
[A]n increase in electoral turnout alone does not necessarily lead to a superior aggregate 
electoral outcome. From our perspective, the decision to vote is a function of the 
intensity of the individual‘s preferences over the very act of voting itself and the extent 
to which the individual is confident in her understanding of the world and the particular 
electoral context. We therefore argue that the unexamined assumption that forcing 
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There are at least a few of general rejoinders to the argument that 
voting should not be too easy because we only want to encourage those 
with the most information to vote. For starters, it is possible that the 
greater the turnout, the more legitimate the democratic government.
127
 
As Emory‘s Michael Kang has noted, ―research suggests that the process 
of voting itself invests voters with a sense of commitment to the fairness 
of the process and greater support for the winning candidates.‖128 
Moreover, the United States as a society has eliminated all barriers to 
voting involving education (banning literacy tests)
129
 and done much to 
assist even those who are illiterate in casting a ballot.
130
 Thus, the culture 
of the United States is one that has already expressed a firm legal 
commitment to bringing the vote to the least formally educated segments 
of the populace. In addition, leaving voting to those with the most 
intense interests and preferences may cause a more polarizing politics.
131
 
These general rejoinders, though, tend to restate the argument for opt-out 
voting without directly engaging the potential problem of bringing less 
informed voters into the mix. 
Beyond the general rejoinders, opt-out voting should not harm the 
capabilities of the electorate and might even encourage registered voters 
to become more educated. First, as one political scientist has noted, ―[i]t 
is not clear . . . that new voters would be much less capable than existing 
voters.‖132 Second, opt-out voting is unlikely to produce a ―worse‖ 
electorate because, unlike more strict compulsory voting systems, opt-
out voting only brings into the electorate persons who are already 
registered. Presumably, this brings into the electorate persons who 
already have a tendency to, at the very least, care a little about politics 
and theoretically might be interested in educating themselves about the 
                                                          
citizens to vote will make them unambiguously more interested in, and informed about, 
the political process is, at least at present, untenable. 
Id. 
 127. MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 63, at 2 (―First, [low turnout] raises 
questions about the legitimacy of democratic government. . . . If a small minority of the population 
elects city, state, and national leaders, political institutions and elected officials may lack the broad 
support and confidence necessary to govern effectively.‖); Hasen, supra note 76, at 2137 
(―[S]ociety is better off if all (or at least many) people vote because a large turnout legitimates 
democratic government, which is itself a public good.‖). 
 128. Michael S. Kang, Voting As Veto, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1221, 1254 (2010) (citing Richard 
Nadeau & André Blais, Accepting the Election Outcome: The Effect of Participation on Losers‘ 
Consent, 23 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 553, 560 (1993)). 
 129. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (2006) (imposing a 
nationwide ban on literacy tests). 
 130. Id. § 1973aa-6 (allowing, with very minimal exceptions, illiterate voters to receive any 
assistance they desire at the polling place). 
 131. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. 
 132. HAJNAL, supra note 96, at 178. 
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candidates and issues.
133
 Third, opt-out voting should give political 
actors the incentive to spend money on educating voters rather than 
turning them out to the polls.
134
 Fourth, there may be ways in which 
elections can be structured to make it simpler for voters to acquire 
information. For instance, local elections that are currently nonpartisan 
could be shifted to partisan contests.
135
 Finally, because a registered 
voter can always cast a ballot for ―None of the Above,‖ those voters who 
think they are uninformed can always employ this ―fail-safe‖ opt-out.136 
In short, to the extent one accepts the premise that only certain types of 
persons should cast ballots (i.e., those who are the most informed), opt-
out voting seems to address most of these concerns. 
On the opposite side of the spectrum from the concern that easier 
voting somehow ―dilutes‖ the electorate would be the concern that opt-
out voting might fail to fulfill its promise of changing the character of 
the electorate so that it is more representative of the citizenry as a whole. 
As previously noted, the citizens who do not cast ballots in elections 
tend to be less educated and less wealthy than their voting 
counterparts.
137
 Because opt-out voting does not mandate universal 
registration and does not compel everyone to participate, the new 
participants brought into the election by opt-out voting might just mirror 
the current electorate. Indeed, it is theoretically possible that opt-out 
voting could make the electorate even less representative if the citizens 
who it brings into the mix are more educated and more wealthy than the 
average current voter.
138
 
It seems likely, though, that if opt-out voting increases turnout 
among registered voters that it will make the electorate more 
representative. From a statistical standpoint, this makes sense. Political 
scientists have noted that as turnout increases, the electorate is likely to 
be more representative of society as a whole.
139
 Moreover, this should 
                                                          
 133. Cf. Lijphart, supra note 6, at 10 (arguing that compulsory voting ―may serve as an 
incentive [for citizens] to become better informed‖). 
 134. Id. (arguing that with compulsory voting ―parties and candidates have a strong incentive 
to pay more attention and work harder to get information to previous non-voters‖). 
 135. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance 
and Election Law 5-6 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 136. Cf. Hasen, supra note 76, at 2175 (―This problem of ignorance could be ameliorated by a 
compulsory voting law that allows ignorant voters to abstain once at the polls.‖). 
 137. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
 138. See Adam J. Berinsky, The Perverse Consequences of Electoral Reform in the United 
States, 33 AM. POL. RES. 471, 473 (2005) (―[R]eforms designed to make the act of voting easier 
increase the socioeconomic bias of the electorate. Rather than stimulating the unengaged, . . . these 
reforms retain engaged voters—those who are rich in politically relevant resources.‖). 
 139. Lijphart, supra note 6, at 3 (―In countries with higher turnout, as expected, the link 
between socioeconomic status and turnout tends to be less strong, often not strong enough to be 
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especially be the case at the local level where turnout tends to be a very 
small percentage of the eligible electorate.
140
 In short, if opt-out voting 
increases turnout, it seems likely to increase the representativeness of the 
electorate. 
2.   Concerns About the Impact on Individual Voters and Specific 
Elections 
Perhaps the biggest issue with opt-out voting is the potential for 
opt-out voting to fail in its mission of increasing turnout and, perhaps, to 
do more harm than good in relation to registered voter participation.
141
 
The theory behind opt-out voting is that a default rule of participation 
combined with the potential penalty of voting for the ―wrong‖ candidate 
will lead voters to pay attention to their ballot and to participate. It is 
possible, though, that this theory is all wrong. 
The theory may be wrong because opt-out voting might cause some 
persons who might have voted to become complacent. The theoretical 
problem can easily be explained with a simple hypothetical example. 
Assume an election for mayor between Winston and Quimby in which 
Marge has been assigned to cast her ballot for Winston but where Marge 
actually prefers Quimby. However, because individuals are more likely 
to stick with default options,
142
 Marge does not switch her vote. Here, 
the benefit of opt-out voting‘s provision of a default rule for 
 
                                                          
statistically significant and sometimes even negative.‖). And the more persons added to the mix, the 
more representative the electorate should be. See id. at 3-4 n.5. 
 140. See Hajnal & Lewis, supra note 62, at 646. 
 141. A related issue is: How will we know if opt-out voting increases turnout? One answer 
would be to total up the number of returned ballots that register a preference for a candidate. But 
that seems likely to undercount participation because it does not include those voters who received a 
ballot and were satisfied with their choice. Presumably, one might attempt a post-election survey to 
calculate the number of voters who intentionally stuck with their assigned candidate rather than just 
defaulting to the assigned candidate. However, surveys of voting behavior tend to be unreliable. See 
Richard Sobel, Voter-ID Issues in Politics and Political Science, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 81, 83 
(2009) (―[P]eople do not always accurately report voting or their complete reasons for failing [to 
vote] . . . .‖). 
  One might also argue that gauging participation by those ballots returned that include a 
vote for a candidate fails to capture those who participated by voting for ―None of the Above.‖ The 
question then is whether a vote for ―None of the Above‖ amounts to participation? The problem is 
that a vote for ―None of the Above‖ is ambiguous: it could represent a thinking-person‘s decision 
after gathering information that none of the candidates merits the registered voter‘s support; yet it 
could also represent laziness on the part of the registered voter. See generally David F. Damore et 
al., Nevada‘s ―None of the Above‖ Voting (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
Presumably, one could also use a post-election survey to separate these types of voters as well. 
 142. See Camerer et al., supra note 13, at 1224 (―People are much more likely to stick with 
existing policies, consumption bundles, legislators, and so on than normative theories would predict, 
even when the costs of switching are very low.‖). 
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participation has been cancelled out because it leads to Marge casting 
the ―wrong‖ vote.143 
It seems unlikely, though, that someone who would have otherwise 
cast a ballot will not vote due to the opt-out system.
144
 As many political 
scientists have come to think, the benefit of voting tends to be 
expressive.
145
 As one pair of commentators put it: ―[C]itizens vote for 
reasons other than the anticipated net (instrumental) benefits derived 
from the electoral outcome; they vote to show support, or solidarity, or 
simply to ‗participate‘ in one of democracy‘s great civic 
opportunities.‖146 In the language of the hypothetical, if the value of 
Marge voting was Marge‘s ability to express herself, it seems unlikely 
that the pre-selection of a candidate will reduce Marge‘s willingness to 
express herself by casting a ballot for a candidate. 
The other possibility is that even if opt-out voting does not have the 
unintended consequence of reducing voter turnout, opt-out voting will 
do nothing to increase turnout. Registered voters who would not 
participate under the existing system might be just as likely to not 
participate under opt-out voting. They might ignore their ballot entirely, 
resulting in random votes for the pre-selected candidates. They also 
might just vote ―None of the Above‖ because they do not want to take 
the time to gather information about the candidates. Put differently, the 
nudge to cast a ballot will not be strong enough. 
There is some reason to believe, though, that ―if you build it, they 
will come‖ works for stimulating the casting of ballots. For instance, one 
strategy for increasing turnout at local elections is to move those 
elections from ―off-years‖ so that local elections coincide with high 
profile, national elections.
147
 One might think, though, that voters might 
just show up to vote for the top-of-the-ticket elections, such as president, 
and then ―roll off‖ by not casting ballots for the local contests. Yet, at 
least one study has concluded that municipal elections held in 
conjunction with presidential elections increase voter turnout by about 
twenty-seven percent, even accounting for those voters who ―rolled 
 
                                                          
 143. Note that, in this instance, I am positing that Marge has made a mistake rather than just 
ignored her ballot entirely. The problem of a registered voter who entirely ignores the opt-out ballot 
will be taken up in just a moment. 
 144. It is possible, though, that opt-out voting could decrease voter registration. For example, if 
citizens know that voter registration will automatically lead to them receiving a ballot at every 
election, citizens might choose to not register in order to avoid their outcomes. 
 145. See Jakee & Sun, supra note 126, at 69. 
 146. Id. at 62. 
 147. MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 63, at 63-64. 
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off.‖148 In short, there is reason to think that once a registered voter starts 
a ballot, the voter does not stop. 
There is no way to know whether the opt-out nudge to increase 
participation will work as well as moving local elections to coincide 
with national elections, but there is at least a plausible reason to think the 
nudge will be strong enough. For starters, if persons cast ballots mostly 
because it makes them feel good (rather than because it makes a 
difference to the outcome of any particular election) then registered 
voters who do not cast ballots do not need the expressive benefit that 
comes from voting. However, registered voters who did not cast ballots 
in an opt-out system would not only fail to gain the expressive benefit by 
not participating. Instead, their lack of participation might lead them to 
feel an expressive negative because they know they may have cast a 
―wrong‖ vote by not paying attention to their ballot. 
Moreover, there may be ways to make the nudge of opt-out stronger 
by increasing the ―social pressure‖ on registered voters.149 In one study, 
registered voters were sent a mailing just prior to an election that showed 
whether they and their neighbors had voted in the past.
150
 The mailing 
also told voters that they would receive another mailing after the election 
that updated the voting records of them and their neighbors.
151
 
Households who received this mailing turned out at much higher rates 
than households who did not receive this mailing.
152
 Thus, one might 
combine opt-out voting with disclosure of those persons who did not 
return their ballot with any changes. 
Yet, even if opt-out voting increases turnout, it is guaranteed that 
some voters will totally ignore their ballots and this could lead to the 
problem of an election being determined by the non-voters. To 
understand how this might possibly happen, take again the hypothetical 
mayoral election between Quimby and Winston. Assume there are one-
hundred registered voters and that fifty registered voters are initially 
assigned to each Quimby and Winston. Assume that only fifty registered 
voters want to affirmatively cast their ballots and that fifty registered 
voters will totally ignore their ballots. Assume that of the fifty voters 
                                                          
 148. See Neal Caren, Big City, Big Turnout? Electoral Participation in American Cities, 29 J. 
URB. AFF. 31, 41 (2007). 
 149. Green & Gerber, supra note 54, at 332-33. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Alan S. Gerber et al., Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale 
Field Experiment, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33, 38, 46 (2008); Green & Gerber, supra note 54, at 
332-33. 
 152. Gerber et al., supra note 151, at 38 (―Even more dramatic is the effect of showing 
households both their own voting records and the voting records of their neighbors. Turnout in this 
experimental group is 37.8%, which implies a remarkable 8.1 percentage-point treatment effect.‖). 
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who desire to register a preference between the two candidates, that 
twenty-six voters want to cast their ballots for Quimby and twenty-four 
voters want to cast their ballots for Winston. Assume, however, that the 
voters who totally ignored their ballots broke thirty for Winston and 
twenty for Quimby. In this hypothetical, then, Winston will 
undeservedly win the election by a margin of fifty-four to forty-six. 
Of course, one can surmise that the number of elections in which 
registered voters who totally ignore their ballots decide the outcome will 
be quite small. For starters, in a large electorate, the voters who totally 
ignore their ballots are likely to be distributed about evenly. Second, 
even if ballots that are totally ignored are slightly non-randomly 
distributed, most elections are not that closely decided.
153
 Thus, even if 
there is a non-random distribution between the candidates of voters who 
totally ignore their ballot, the non-random distribution is not likely to 
determine the outcome. In other words, it is not likely the difference in 
the random distribution among ballots between the first- and second-
place candidates will exceed the margin of victory for the candidate who 
won among those registered voters who actively participated.
154
 
Yet, it is still possible that opt-out voting would cause some 
elections to be wrongly decided by those who totally ignored their 
ballot; however, our current voting system already creates the possibility 
of a ―wrong outcome.‖ Elections are imperfect, and when it comes to a 
very close election, it is not entirely clear that the candidate preferred by 
most of the electorate actually is the one that gets sworn in.
155
 To take 
what is perhaps the highest profile example available, following the 
disputed 2000 presidential election between George W. Bush and Al 
Gore, a study by the media found that Gore would have won the election 
if both overvotes and undervotes had been recounted.
156
 Put more 
starkly, there is already a certain amount of randomness in determining 
the winner when it comes to deciding close elections using our current 
system of balloting. 
                                                          
 153. Michael J. Pitts, Essay, Heads or Tails?: A Modest Proposal for Deciding Close 
Elections, 39 CONN. L. REV. 739, 745 (2006) (―The vast majority of elections are not nail-
biters . . . .‖); see also Stephen Ansolabehere & Andrew Reeves, Using Recounts to Measure the 
Accuracy of Vote Tabulations: Evidence from New Hampshire Elections 1946-2002, at 1-8 
(CalTech/MIT Voting Tech. Project Working Paper No. 11, 2004), available at http://www.vote. 
caltech.edu/drupal/files/working_paper/vtp_wp11.pdf. 
 154. See Ansolabehere & Reeves, supra note 153, at 8. 
 155. Pitts, supra note 153, at 745 (―[E]lections won by small margins pretty much amount to a 
draw.‖). 
 156. See Dan Keating & Dan Balz, Florida Recounts Would Have Favored Bush: But Study 
Finds Gore Might Have Won Statewide Tally of All Uncounted Ballots, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 
2001, at A1. Indeed, this study did not even account for Palm Beach County‘s infamous butterfly 
ballot. Id. at A10. 
2011] OPT-OUT VOTING 931 
Lastly, the hope is that opt-out voting will nudge registered voters 
to not ignore their ballots. When it comes to those who are, say, too busy 
to vote, the hope would be that opt-out voting incentivizes those 
registered voters to cast their ballots for the candidate they truly prefer 
or, at the very least, to vote ―None of the Above.‖ When it comes to 
those who truly do not care, the hope is that these persons will either be 
incentivized to learn more about the candidates and cast a vote, or again, 
at the very least, return their ballots to indicate ―None of the Above.‖ Of 
course, to make this hope a reality, there would undoubtedly need to be 
lots of voter education to channel these registered voters to take the 
appropriate action. 
One final problem that could be an issue involves the complexity of 
opt-out voting. It is possible that registered voters will find the system 
confusing. If they find the system confusing, they might just give up. 
Confusion could also lead to unintentional mistakes by voters. For this 
reason, any switch to opt-out voting would likely need to be 
accompanied by a well-designed voter education campaign (a monetary 
cost).
 
 
At the end of the day, opt-out voting holds theoretical promise but 
also theoretical pitfalls that will need further exploration and 
experimentation in order to more precisely calibrate the costs and 
benefits of such a system. 
B. Election Administration Objections to Opt-Out Voting 
Opt-out voting is relatively simple in design but a number of 
important barriers exist from a pragmatic election administration 
standpoint. At this point, it bears emphasizing that the idea of opt-out 
voting could not be implemented with any sort of ease tomorrow absent 
some sort of Harry Potter-like wizardry. Here, what I want to note are 
some of the main existing barriers to opt-out voting from an election 
administration standpoint and why I think that in coming years, the 
system of election administration could change in such a way as to make 
this manner of elections possible. Currently, the most substantial 
election administration issues related to opt-out voting would seem to 
involve faulty voter registration rolls, possible breaches of ballot 
secrecy, and the sheer complexity of implementing the system. 
The most obvious difficulty with regard to opt-out voting is that 
voter registration lists are currently a mess.
157
 Ample evidence exists to 
                                                          
 157. See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Voter Registration List Quality Pilot Studies: Report on 
Detailed Results 5-9 (June 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.pewcenter  
onthestates.org/uploadedFiles/voter_registration_list_results.pdf?n=7473. 
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think that there are many names on voter registration lists that should not 
be there.
158
 Poor voter registration list maintenance exists despite the fact 
that in the past two decades we have witnessed the enactment of two 
federal statutes aimed at prodding state and local officials to clean up 
their voting rolls.
159
 Indeed, the U.S. Attorney General has brought 
several lawsuits against jurisdictions that appear to be doing a poor job 
of maintaining their registration lists.
160
 While these lawsuits were 
somewhat controversial and possibly motivated by partisan goals, it 
would seem that widespread agreement exists that voter registration lists 
are not models of good government.
161
 The problem with opt-out voting 
and poor registration list maintenance is that votes could be pre-assigned 
to registered voters who do not exist. 
Messy voter registration rolls are certainly a current barrier to opt-
out voting, but there is reason for optimism that voter registration rolls 
may someday be accurate enough so that any errors in the rolls are 
negligible to nonexistent. Part of the reason for optimism on this account 
is that there does appear to be some bipartisan support for modernizing 
America‘s voter registration system.162 While any modernization of 
voter registration will undoubtedly take years to perfect, it is almost 
certain that any modernization program would include, as part of its 
package of reforms, steps that would lead to much greater accuracy in 
the registration rolls.
163
 Moreover, this is a similar problem to voters 
who totally ignore their ballots deciding the election and, as previously 
discussed, it would seem that there are good reasons to think that such 
 
                                                          
 158. See id. at 8. 
 159. See National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, § 2, 107 Stat. 77 (1993) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2006)); Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2006)). 
 160. See, e.g., United States v. Missouri, No. 05-4391-CV-C-NKL, 2006 WL 144356, at *8 
(W.D. Mo. May 25, 2006); Complaint at 1, 4, United States v. Missouri, No. 05-4391-CV-C-NKL, 
2005 WL 3683710 (W.D. Mo. May 25, 2006). 
 161. See Tokaji, supra note 28, at 480-81. To the extent there is disagreement, the dividing line 
typically revolves around whether ghost names on the rolls have any detrimental impact on 
elections, most notably by allowing for voter impersonation fraud. See LORI MINNITE & DAVID 
CALLAHAN, SECURING THE VOTE: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTION FRAUD 29-30 (2003), available at 
http://www.michiganelectionreformalliance.org/EDR_Securing_the_Vote.pdf. 
 162. For example, the Committee to Modernize Voter Registration is a bipartisan group 
working to modernize voter registration. Their website is available at Different Sides of the Aisle–
Same Perspective, COMMITTEE TO MODERNIZE VOTER REGISTRATION, http://www.modernize  
registration.org/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2011). 
 163. The Problem with Paper, COMMITTEE TO MODERNIZE VOTER REGISTRATION, http:// 
www.modernizeregistration.org/the-case/the-problem-with-paper/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2011) 
(mentioning fake names like ―Mickey Mouse‖ and ―Dick Tracy‖ as part of the problem with the 
current registration system). 
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―voters‖ would be randomly distributed and not determine the outcome 
of most elections.
164
 
Apart from messy registration rolls, ballot secrecy (or potential lack 
thereof) could be a problem. The primary ballot secrecy problem 
implicated by opt-out voting lies in the tracking of votes in that 
seemingly there needs to be some record somewhere of how each person 
voted. For instance, if Marge has been pre-selected to vote for Quimby 
and changes her vote to Winston, there would seem to be the need for an 
election administrator somewhere to switch Marge‘s vote from Quimby 
to Winston. If this is the case, then the election administrator, whoever 
he or she might be, has the possibility of knowing the exact choice 
Marge made when she cast her ballot. 
While it would be nice and convenient to say that in the future there 
will be a technological development that will obviate this problem, it 
seems doubtful the problem could be totally eliminated. It is possible 
that some mechanism could be developed similar to which has been 
developed to preserve anonymity when it comes to law school exams. 
For example, where I teach at Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis, the students are given an examination number and I grade 
the examination not knowing which student is assigned to which 
number. After I turn in my grades, I receive a master list that provides 
the name assigned to each number. What this means for opt-out voting is 
that, presumably, a registered voter‘s ballot can be turned into a number 
and the person recording the change to a ballot could only have a 
numerical identifier. The problem, though, is that somewhere, someone 
will still have to have the ―master list‖ that matches names and numbers, 
and the list could fall into the wrong hands. 
It would seem that any sort of opt-out system is going to leave 
some sort of paper trail that could lead to a possible breach in the secret 
ballot. From a historical perspective, one could argue that the secret 
ballot is not as ingrained in the American experience as one might think 
and actually has some not so savory origins.
165
 From a more modern, 
pragmatic perspective, one could argue that the possibility of tracing the 
numeric identifiers back to a specific individual, if done with appropriate 
concern for security, makes the possibility of a breach in ballot secrecy 
slight. On this score, though, one might have concerns that election 
                                                          
 164. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. 
 165. ALEC C. EWALD, THE WAY WE VOTE: THE LOCAL DIMENSION OF AMERICAN SUFFRAGE 
64-65 (2009) (―Not until the period between 1888 and 1896 did states require votes to be secret, 
marked on ballots produced by the state or local government.‖); SCHAFFER, supra note 87, at 22 
(2008) (describing how in Arkansas and in the South more generally the secret ballot was ―one of 
many measures adopted by Democrats to disenfranchise black voters‖).  
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administrators, like any large government or private organization, are 
not trustworthy enough to be given the keys to run such a system. After 
all, one could be concerned that if a list of voter choices existed, 
government actors might use those lists to engage in nefarious, big-
brother, pay-to-play conduct. Or, more likely, one might be concerned 
that government officials might lack the competence to keep data from 
being breached. Thus, opt-out voting theoretically provides less 
protection for ballot secrecy than the current system. 
Finally, implementation of opt-out voting could be somewhat 
complex when it comes to a lengthy ballot and this complexity could 
create trouble. For instance, when a ballot features one or two contests—
a mayoral contest and the city council—opt-out voting would seemingly 
be rather simple to implement. However, when a ballot features dozens 
of contests and referendum questions, then the system becomes far more 
complex to administer. This complexity can have costs. Complex 
operations may lead to more mistakes both in the random assignments of 
candidates to voters and in the switching of voter preferences from one 
candidate to another. Relatedly, this complexity could lead to delays in 
tabulation and higher financial costs in the conduct of the election. In the 
end, opt-out voting would have to be designed in a way to efficiently and 
accurately allow for ballot changes.
166
 
In the end, there are undoubtedly possible concerns with opt-out 
voting. Some of the concerns are theoretical, relate to whether opt-out 
voting would actually increase voter turnout, and probably can only be 
addressed by empirical experimentation. Other concerns center more on 
the current system of election administration that the United States 
employs. These election administration concerns, though, are probably 
more easily addressed if the theoretical promise of opt-out voting proves 
accurate. 
                                                          
 166. One issue that can arise in administering opt-out voting occurs when the number of 
registered voters does not divide evenly amongst the candidates. For instance, in the simple 
hypothetical presented earlier in this Article with the mayoral race between Quimby and Winston 
that included 100 registered voters and two candidates for office, each candidate could be assigned 
the exact same number of registered voters. But what if we had two candidates and 101 registered 
voters? We cannot divide a vote in half, so it is possible one candidate would get the extra voter, 
which would not seem fair. 
  But the problem of having a number of registered voters that does not divide evenly 
amongst the candidates is not much of a barrier. For starters, in an election with thousands of votes, 
one vote will almost never make a difference. Nevertheless, in smaller electorates, one vote can 
make or break an election for a candidate. Thus, to solve the problem, the registered voters could be 
randomly divided as evenly as possible between the candidates and any remaining voters (likely a 
handful at most) would have their ballot assigned to ―None of the Above.‖ 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Obviously, opt-out voting represents a unique, cutting-edge idea 
that holds some promise for increasing voter turnout but might create 
other difficulties as well. Indeed, at the end of the day, opt-out voting 
might be a net positive for elections in the United States or it might not 
be. My hope is that penning this Article does at least a couple of things. 
First, it would be a positive if this Article spurred more 
commentators to think about ideas that might be described as default 
nudges in the context of electoral participation. Default nudges have 
crept into the dialogue regarding voter registration, but it may be 
possible to take the concept further—further, but perhaps not as far as it 
was taken here. Moreover, on the converse side, I hope that a vigorous 
counter-offensive is embarked upon by those who think default nudges 
have little or no place in the electoral context—for it is only through 
critique that ideas improve. 
Second, it would be wonderful if a few jurisdictions in the United 
States experimented with this idea within the next few years. One of the 
issues with election reform is that ideas are often put into motion without 
adequate experimentation—that one problem often is solved only to 
create potential additional problems. In this context, consider the post-
2000 election reforms that replaced punch-card machines with electronic 
voting mechanisms.
167
 Punch-cards were certainly a problem, but 
perhaps too hasty a decision was made about what to replace punch-card 
machines with.
168
 In addition, empirical data on the operation of such a 
system on a small scale, and then a slightly bigger scale, and then a 
slightly bigger scale, should probably be an absolute requirement before 
implementation of any new electoral system. Perhaps through such 
experimentation, the voting future could be quite different. 
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